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How "Sex" Got Into Title VII: Persistent
Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy
Jo Freeman*
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a milestone of federal legis-
lation. Like much major legislation, it had "incubated" for decades
but was birthed in turmoil. On June 19, 1963, after the civil rights
movement of the fifties and early sixties had focused national at-
tention on racial injustice, President John F. Kennedy sent a draft
omnibus civil rights bill to the Congress.' On February 8, 1964,
while the bill was being debated on the House floor, Rep. Howard
W. Smith of Virginia, Chairman of the Rules Committee and
staunch opponent of all civil rights legislation, rose up and offered
a one-word amendment to Title VII, which prohibited employment
discrimination. He proposed to add "sex" to the bill in order "to
prevent discrimination against another minority group, the women
. . "2 This stimulated several hours of humorous debate, later en-
shrined as "Ladies Day in the House,"3 before the amendment was
passed by a teller vote of 168 to 133.
In only a few hours, Congress initiated a major innovation in
public policy, one which rippled throughout the country for sev-
eral years. Prior to the amendment's passage, only two states-
Hawaii and Wisconsin-had laws which prohibited sex discrimina-
tion in employment. Within four years, fifteen states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia did so, and, within ten years, all but a few states
included "sex" among the prohibited discriminations in their fair
employment practices laws.4 Although the agency created by the
Act to enforce Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunities
© 1991 by Jo Freeman
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thor of Politics of Liberation (1975) and editor of Women: A Feminist Perspective
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1. See Robert D. Loevy, To End All Segregation: The Politics of the Passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 5-34 (1990).
2. 110 Cong. Rec. 2577 (1964).
3. See Caroline Bird with Sara Welles Briller, Born Female: The High Cost of
Keeping Women Down (rev. ed. 1973).
4. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bulletin 297, 1975 Handbook on Wo-
men Workers, at 324-25 (1975).
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Commission (EEOC), viewed the sex amendment as a "fluke,"
"conceived out of wedlock," and tried to ignore its existence,5 fully
one-third of the complaints filed with the EEOC in the first year
charged discrimination on the basis of sex.6 The EEOC's apathy
stimulated the formation of the National Organization for Women
(NOW), whose initial goal was to pressure the agency to enforce
the law. NOW also provided lawyers for women who wanted to
take their sex discrimination complaints to court.7 As a conse-
quence, the federal courts voided state protective laws on the
grounds that they were in conflict with the federal prohibition
against sex discrimination.8 These laws-which limited the hours
women could work and the weights they could lift, and which
often prohibited night work and entry into some occupations con-
sidered too dangerous for women-had been actively sought dur-
ing the first half of the twentieth century by an earlier generation
of women activists. 9  I
The popular interpretation of the addition of "sex" to Title
VII is that "it was the result of a deliberate ploy by foes of the bill
to scuttle it."iO Even a political scientist as well read in the Con-
gressional Record as Gary Orfield accepted the interpretation that
"[b]itter opponents of the job discrimination title... decided to try
to load up the bill with objectionable features that might split the
coalition supporting it."" This view, appealing though it seems, ig-
nores several factors apparent to anyone who has tried to influ-
ence a congressional vote: 1) The potential beneficiaries of the
amendment-women-had experienced lobbyists on the Hill and
were not uninterested in the bill; 2) most Southerners had con-
ceded defeat and gone home by Wednesday;12 the vote occurred on
a Saturday, which is not Members' favorite day to be in Washing-
ton; 3) the number of Members voting on the amendment-301-
was larger than any other counted vote that day (the others
ranged from 178 to 240); 4) other amendments which might "clut-
5. Jo Freeman, The Politics of Women's Liberation: A Case Study of An
Emerging Social Movement and Its Relation to the Policy Process 54 (1975).
6. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Fifth Annual Report 30
(1971).
7. Marguerite Rawalt, The Reminiscences of Marguerite Rawalt, in the Co-
lumbia University Oral History Research Center, 454-59 (1980).
8. Freeman, supra note 5, at 186-87.
9. Susan Lehrer, Origins of Protective Labor Legislation for Women: 1909-
1925, at 3 (1987).
10. Charles Whalen and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative
History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 234 (1985).
11. Gary Orfield, Congressional Power: Congress and Social Change 299 (1975).
12. Whalen and Whalen, supra note 10, at 110-11.
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ter up" the bill, including "sex" amendments to other titles, were
voted down.
Before offering an alternative explanation which takes these
factors into account, it is necessary to place the "sex" amendment
into historical context. While the prohibition of employment dis-
crimination on the basis of sex was not a widely debated, thor-
oughly researched policy proposal, neither was it an "accidental
breakthrough."l3
The National Woman's Party and the Equal Rights Amendment
The National Woman's Party (NWP) had been lobbying for
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) since it was first introduced
into Congress in 1923. The NWP was originally founded by the
militant branch of the Suffrage Movement in 1916. Once the nine-
teenth amendment to the Constitution was ratified, the NWP,
under the leadership of Alice Paul, reorganized itself to focus at-
tention on the eradication of legal discrimination against women
through another constitutional amendment.14 Concentrated in
Washington and funded more by legacies and wealthy benefactors
than a large membership, the NWP found this strategy suitable to
its particular strengths as well as its feminist ideology.15 The ERA
was strongly opposed by the newly created Women's Bureau in the
Department of Labor and virtually every other women's organiza-
tion, particularly the League of Women Voters, the National Con-
sumer's League, and the Women's Trade Union League. Their
opposition was based on the one fact about the ERA on which eve-
ryone could agree: that it would abolish protective labor legislation
for women.
The National Woman's Party and the Women's Bureau coali-
tion16 fought each other to a standstill throughout the 1920s and
13. Orfield, supra note 11, at 299.
14. J. Stanley Lemons, The Woman Citizen: Social Feminism in the 1920s 49
(1973).
15. The NWP's primary benefactor was Alva Belmont, who bought for it a his-
toric Capitol Hill mansion to use as a national headquarters. When that mansion
was condemned to make way for the Supreme Court building, the NWP bought
still another historic home. NWP remains headquartered in the aptly named Bel-
mont House to this day. For more on the NWP's finances, see Susan D. Becker,
The Origins of the Equal Rights Amendment: American Feminism Between the
Wars 38-42 (1981).
16. This term is adopted from Cynthia Harrison, Prelude to Feminism: Wo-
men's Organizations, the Federal Government, and the Rise of the Women's Move-
ment, 1942-1968 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Dep't of History, Columbia University, 1982)
[hereinafter Harrison Dissertation]; Cynthia Harrison, On Account of Sex: The
Politics of Women's Issues, 1945-1968, at 8 (1988) (hereinafter Harrison, On Account
of Sex]. However, she wrote about the period 1945-1968, when the coalition was pri-
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1930s. But by the 1940s, the NWP was gaining the upper hand.
House and Senate subcommittees were reporting it favorably, the
Republican Party endorsed the ERA in its 1940 platform, and the
Democratic Party followed suit in 1944. The Senate voted on the
ERA for the first time on July 19, 1946, after three days of debate.
Although the tally, 38 to 35, was well below the two-thirds re-
quired for a constitutional amendment,17 expectations of favorable
action in the next Congress were high because "there has been a
subtle change in the public attitude toward [the ERA]."'8 During
World War II, state protective labor laws were waived by state leg-
islatures and labor boards in order that women could work in the
war industries while "WACS, WAVES, SPARS and women
Marines took over strenuous jobs, some of them on front-line
assignments."19
The Women's Bureau coalition decided to change tactics from
mere opposition to a "more positive" approach. It had always
agreed with the NWP that women faced discrimination in the job
market, particularly in pay, but had argued that this and the dis-
criminatory laws which truly hurt women were better dealt with
through "specific bills for specific ills" rather than the broad
sweep of a constitutional amendment. 20 In its new incarnation as
the National Committee to Defeat the UnEqual Rights Amend-
ment (NCDURA), the Women's Bureau coalition proposed an
Equal Pay Act.21 The idea of equal pay for equal work had been
around since at least 1868.22 Two states had passed equal pay laws;
but until 1945 there was no attempt to pass such a law on the fed-
eral level. Even with the backing of the NCDURA, a federal equal
pay act was not successful, either as an anti-ERA measure or in its
own right, because of fears that it would encourage women to stay
in the work force and take jobs away from returning soldiers.2
Their next tactic, by the renamed National Committee on the
Status of Women, was to propose a "Status Bill" which declared
marily composed of labor and liberal organizations that the Women's Bureau called
upon to oppose the ERA. In the 1920s, the Bureau played more of a supportive role
than a leadership role for a coalition composed almost entirely of women's organi-
zations, joined together in the Women's Joint Congressional Committee.
Sophonisba P. Breckinridge, Women in the Twentieth Century 259-61 (1933, re-
printed 1972).
17. 92 Cong. Rec. 9405 (1946); Thomas C. Pardo, The National Woman's Party
Papers, 1913-1974: A Guide to the Microfilm Edition 127-34, (1979).
18. 25 Cong. Dig. 290 (1946).
19. Id.
20. Harrison, On Account of Sex, supra note 16, at 39.
21. I
22. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Action for Equal Pay (1966).
23. Harrison, On Account of Sex, supra note 16, at 39.
[Vol. 9:163
TITLE VII
the policy of the United States to be that "in law and its adminis-
tration no distinctions on the basis of sex shall be made except
such as are reasonably justified by differences in physical struc-
ture, biological, or social function."24 Instead of enforcement pro-
visions, it would have created a Commission on the Legal Status of
Women to study sex discrimination.25
In January 1950 the ERA was debated on the Senate floor
once again. When the Status Bill was overwhelmingly rejected, 19
to 65, Sen. Carl Hayden (D., Ariz.) proposed an amendment to the
ERA which read "The provisions of this article shall not be con-
strued to impair any rights, benefits, or exemptions now or hereaf-
ter conferred by law upon persons of the female sex." ERA
proponents were caught by surprise, and many Senators, whose
support for the ERA had been on the record but never very
strong, took advantage of the opportunity to vote for both the
rider and the Amendment. The Hayden rider passed 51 to 31 and
the ERA, thus vitiated, passed 63 to 19.26 This strategy was re-
peated when the ERA once again came to the Senate floor in July
of 1953. This time the rider passed by 58 to 25 and the ERA passed
by 73 to 11.2
The ERA never had a chance in the House. Rep. Emanual
Celler (D., N.Y.) had been Chair of the Judiciary Committee since
1949. He was a crusty liberal from Brooklyn who shared labor's
antipathy to the ERA. No hearings were held on the ERA during
his chairmanship until 1971--after a successful discharge petition
by Rep. Martha Griffiths (D., Mich.) in 1970.28 Between Celler in
the House and Hayden in the Senate, opponents of the ERA suc-
cessfully bottled it up. The NWP continued to walk the halls of
Congress every year and faithfully collect endorsements from
members of both houses well above the two-thirds needed for pas-
sage. But there was no serious interest in the amendment apart
24. Id. at 27.
25. Id at 26-29.
26. 96 Cong. Rec. 872-73 (1950); 6 Cong. Q. Almanac 539 (1950).
27. 99 Cong. Rec. 8973-74 (1953); 9 Cong. Q. Almanac 386 (1950).
28. During floor debate, compelled by the discharge petition, on the ERA in
August, opponents objected to the Amendment's being voted on without "full and
thorough hearings in committee" which had just been scheduled for September.
No hearings were held that year, because the ERA was passed by the House by 352
to 15. 116 Cong. Rec. 27,999-28,037 (1970). During debate by the Senate in October,
riders were added to exempt women from the draft and permit prayer in public
schools. 116 Cong. Rec. 35,050, 35,448-75, 35,621-28, 35,748, 35,934-37, 35,943-66,
36,265-78, 36.299-313, 36,448-51, 36,478-506, 36,862-66 (1970). These additions killed
the ERA until the next Congress. Hearings were held in the House in March and
April of 1971, and the House passed the ERA in October. The Senate passed it in
its undiluted form in March of 1972.
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from the NWP and the few other women's organizations who had
endorsed it in the preceding decades. Even these could do little
more than pass resolutions. The NWP was a small, exclusive or-
ganization, whose aging members refused to relinquish leadership
of the struggle to anyone else--even when it could no longer pub-
lish its journal Equal Rights.29 Consequently, it could still get the
ERA introduced into Congress, but it could not get it passed.30
In 1961 President Kennedy appointed Esther Peterson as As-
sistant Secretary of Labor and Director of the Women's Bureau.
Two of the most important items on her agenda were passage of
the Equal Pay Act and derailment of the ERA. To accomplish the
first, she organized a concerted lobbying campaign which drew
upon the expertise and contacts Peterson had developed as a lob-
byist for the AFL-CIO. The campaign for the Equal Pay Act took
two years of solid work, during which there were three sets of
hearings, two in the House and one in the Senate. The final bill
was narrower than Peterson and Equal Pay Act advocates had
wanted and only covered sixty-one percent of the female labor
force. But by the time President Kennedy signed the Equal Pay
Act into law on June 10, 1963, both Houses had heard ample testi-
mony on the problems faced by women in the labor force.3 1
One of Peterson's first recommendations to the new Presi-
dent was the creation of a national commission on women-a com-
ponent of the 1947 Status Bill-which she argued would end "the
present troublesome and futile agitation over the ERA,"32 but
which she also hoped would provide an alternative program of ac-
tion to improve women's status.33 To avoid the NWP lobbyists, the
President's Commission on the Status of Women was created by
Executive Order 10,980 on December 14, 1961. Eleanor Roosevelt
was named the chair, and among the members was only one ERA
supporter. This was Marguerite Rawalt, a lawyer with the Inter-
nal Revenue Service and a former President of the National Fed-
eration of Business and Professional Women (BPW). The final
29. Leila J. Rupp and Verta Taylor, Survival in the Doldrums: The American
Women's Rights Movement, 1945 to the 1960s 74-5 (1987).
30. The Senate did briefly consider the ERA one more time, on July 2, 1960,
and just as quickly voted to add the Hayden rider and recommit it to Committee.
106 Cong. Rec. 15,683, 15,686 (1960).
31. Harrison, On Account of Sex, supra note 16, at 89-105.
32. Catherine East, The First Stage: ERA in Washington 1961-1972, Women's
Political Times, Sept. 1982, at 7. See also Pauli Murray, Song in a Weary Throat:
An American Pilgrimage 348-49 (1987).
33. Esther Peterson, The Reminiscences of Esther Peterson, in the Columbia




report and recommendations of the Commission, American Wo-
men, were issued amid much publicity on October 11, 1963, with
recommendations in the areas of education, social security, child
care, public and private employment, and protective labor legisla-
tion. It quickly became something of a Government Printing Of-
fice best-seller. Over 83,000 copies were distributed within a year,
and a private publisher put out a commercial version with an Epi-
logue by Margaret Mead.34
Fair Employment Practices Proposals
The roots of Title VII can be traced to the Unemployment
Relief Act of 1933, which provided "[tihat in employing citizens for
the purposes of this Act no discrimination shall be made on ac-
count of race, color, or creed."3 Most laws passed in the New
Deal affecting employment contained similar provisions, or they
were "read into" the Acts by Executive regulations.3 6 However,
these were little more than statements of good intentions, as there
were no enforcement mechanisms. Their ineffectiveness was high-
lighted by the systematic exclusion of blacks from the new jobs
created by the mushrooming defense industries prior to World
War 11.37 Even before the United States entered the war, black
leaders pressed President Roosevelt to sign an Executive Order
with teeth in it that would ban discrimination in these industries.
Faced with a threatened march on Washington, Roosevelt did so
on June 25, 1941. Executive Order 8802 established the Fair Em-
ployment Practices (FEP) Committee with the modest powers to
investigate complaints of discrimination and take "appropriate
steps."36 Although its authority was extended to all federal con-
tractors by Executive Order 9346 in 1943, its enforcement power
was limited to negotiation and moral suasion. It expired in June,
1946.39
34. President's Commission on the Status of Women, American Women: The
Report of the President's Commission on the Status of Women and Other Publica-
tions of the Commission (Margaret Mead and Frances Balgley Kaplan eds. 1965)
[hereinafter American Women].
35. Unemployment Relief Act, Ch. 17, 48 Stat. 22, 23 (1933).
36. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Legislative History of Titles VII
and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 1-3 (n.d.) [hereinafter EEOC, Legislative
History].
37. Id at 1-2.
38. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
39. Exec. Order No. 9346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (1943). Paul Burstein, Discrimina-
tion, Jobs and Politics: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity in the
United States since the New Deal 8 (1985); EEOC, Legislative History, supra note
36, at 1-3; Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of
National Policy, 1960-1972, at 10-12 (1990).
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Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy each estab-
lished FEP committees by Executive Order, though under differ-
ent names and with different foci. 40 The Kennedy Committee on
Equal Employment Opportunity differed from its predecessors in
that it required affirmative action to eliminate discrimination and
had the power to terminate the contracts of noncomplying employ-
ers as well as to recommend suits to the Justice Department.41 Its
scope was broadened to include virtually all programs and busi-
nesses receiving federal money.42 Nonetheless the "most effective
method of achieving compliance... was... cooperation."43
The first FEP bill was introduced in 1943.44 Over the next
twenty years, many more were introduced into every Congress,
but only three ever reached the floor; the rest were bottled up in
committee. The Senate debated FEP bills in 1946 and 1950, but
they were filibustered to death when proponents could not muster
the necessary two-thirds vote for cloture. These were also the first
two years in which the ERA was debated on the floor of the Sen-
ate, which may explain why provisions to prohibit sex discrimina-
tion in employment were proposed to the House those same two
years.45 Early in 1946 Rep. Clare E. Hoffman (R., Mich.) intro-
duced H.R. 5216, which included sex, ancestry, and union member-
ship as protected classes. It was committed to the Labor
Committee where it died.46 On February 22, 1950, Rep. Dwight L.
Rogers (D., Fla.) offered a floor amendment to add "sex" to the
FEP bill then being debated "so the women of the country will
have equal rights with men."47 No one spoke against it and it
40. Richard Nathan, Jobs and Civil Rights: The Role of the Federal Govern-
ment in Promoting Equal Opportunity in Employment and Training 87-89 (1969).
EEOC, Legislative History, supa note 36, at 4-5 (referring to Exec. Orders 10,308,
10,479, 10,925, 11,114). Exec. Order 11,308 is at 16 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953); Exec. Order
10,479 is at 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953); Exec. Order 10,925 is at 26 Fed. Reg. 1977
(1961); Exec. Order 11,114 is at 28 Fed. Reg. 6485 (1963).
41. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961). According to Graham, the
use of the phrase "affirmative action" was not viewed as a major departure from
prior practices, but as a referent for "a more aggressive strategy for seeking out mi-
nority applicants .... Graham, supra note 39, at 33.
42. Exec. Order No. 11,114, 28 Fed. Reg. 6485 (1963).
43. EEOC, Legislative History, supra note 36, at 4.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Although I have found no definitive evidence explaining the coincidence of
dates, it is too striking to go unnoted. The most likely explanation is that 1946 and
1950 were two years in which the NWP was particularly active. Nonetheless, it
should be noted that the Senate debated the ERA on July 9, 1946, long after Hoff-
man introduced his bill. It passed the ERA, with the Hayden rider, on January 25,
1950, one month before Rogers made his amendment. 92 Cong. Rec. 8433 (1946).
46. 92 Cong. Rec. 313 (1946).
47. 96 Cong. Rec. 2247 (1950).
[Vol. 9:163
TITLE VII
passed by a voice vote.48 The amended bill passed the House by
240 to 177 the following day, but the Senate defeated it. This was
the first time either house of Congress voted to equate race and
sex discrimination.49
Such an equation was standard policy for the NWP. Its con-
servative members were not pro-civil rights. Most would have pre-
ferred no government regulation of employment. But the aging
organization did not wish to see any group given rights that were
not also given equally to women, and it had no compunctions about
taking advantage of any opportunity that came along to advance its
cause.5 0 Throughout the fifties it lobbied to have sex discrimina-
tion included in the jurisdiction of the President's Committee on
Government Contracts (Eisenhower's FEPC), but it was turned
down on the grounds that the addition would make enforcement
difficult.5x It was more successful in 1956, albeit temporarily, in
persuading the House to include sex discrimination in the jurisdic-
tion of the proposed Civil Rights Commission. Once again the
mechanism was a floor amendment - introduced by Rep. Gordon
McDonough (R., Cal.) at the request of his campaign chair, who
was an NWP member. When McDonough's wife expressed opposi-
tion, NWP representative Amelia Walker asked Rep. Howard W.
Smith (D., Va.) to introduce it instead.52 Smith consented, but Mc-
Donough announced his intentions to introduce the amendment to
the House as soon as House debate began on July 17, 1956. Smith
voiced his approval of the amendment, stating that "if this iniqui-
tous piece of legislation is to be adopted, we certainly ought to try
to do whatever good with it that we can."5 3
McDonough was pressured by NAACP lobbyist Clarence
48. Ic.
49. EEOC, Legislative History, supra note 36, at 7-8.
50. Rupp and Taylor, supra note 29, at 153-65, have an extensive discussion of
the attitude of the NWP and other women's organizations towards racial issues. In-
dividual members' views varied from extremely racist to integrationist, but by and
large the organizations reflected the tenor of their time and place. Alice Paul her-
self was quite monolithic; she would support any person, group, or idea that would
advance the ERA and dismissed as irrelevant anyone or anything that didn't.
51. Rupp and Taylor, supra note 29, at 176; Pardo, supra note 23, at 161-62. A
letter of September 3, 1956, to Helen Rogers Reid from National Woman's Party
Congressional Chairman (Alice Paul) documents one attempt to pressure a mem-
ber of the President's Committee on Government Contracts to resume her efforts
to add sex discrimination to the Committee's jurisdiction. National Woman's Party
Papers, 1913-1974 (microfilmed and distributed by the Microfilm Corporation of
America 1979) on reel 102 [hereinafter NWP Papers].
52. A letter of July 20, 1956, from NWP Congressional Chairman (Alice Paul)
to Mary Sinclair Crawford, who initiated the idea, details the approach to McDon-
ough. NWP Papers, supra note 51, on reel 102.
53. 102 Cong. Rec. 13,124-25 (1956).
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Mitchell to change his mind. When he refused, the opposition or-
ganized.54 No sooner did the clerk read the one-word amendment
two days later, than Rep. Celler tried to turn the issue into an
ERA debate. Although the proposed Commission's sole authority
was to investigate, "sex" was not germane, he said, because "dis-
tinctions based on sex have never been considered within the pur-
view of [the] prohibition[s of the Fourteenth Amendment." 55
Four Democratic Congresswomen agreed that adding "sex" would
"destroy the real purpose of this bill and will lead to its defeat."5
Nonetheless, after eloquent pleas by Reps. McDonough, Katherine
St. George (R., N.Y.), chief House sponsor of the ERA, and Smith,
the House voted in favor by 115 to 83.57 The bill was passed by the
House, but, by prior arrangement among the leadership, it was
sent to the Senate too late to become law.58 It was reintroduced
and passed in the next Congress as part of the 1957 Civil Rights
Act-without the sex amendment. The NWP thought the debate
over the McDonough amendment was "a great help to our case,"
but the request for a "sex" amendment was not renewed.59
Title VII
Although few people really took seriously the NWP's efforts
to equate sex and race discrimination, ERA opponents were of two
minds. They acknowledged that women experienced discrimina-
tion in employment and argued that specific anti-discrimination
measures would be preferable to the ERA. But opponents also be-
lieved, as the President's Commission on the Status of Women
concluded in 1963, that "discrimination based on sex ... involves
problems sufficiently different from discrimination based on the
other factors listed to make separate treatment preferable." 60
However, apart from the Equal Pay Act, they had no program to
deal with sex discrimination.
The NWP had a simple program-the ERA. It saw in the
civil rights acts an opportunity to educate Congress on the need for
the ERA. Even before the Commission's report was released, the
NWP was lobbying to have "sex" added to the latest Civil Rights
54. Alice Paul, Conversations with Alice Paul: Woman Suffrage and the ERA
(interviewed by Amelia Fry, November 1972, May 1973) in Suffragists Oral History
Project, Bancroft Library, University of California (Berkeley) 617-18.
55. 102 Cong. Rec. 13,557 (1956).
56. Id. at 13,552.
57. Id at 13,552-57. The four Democratic Congresswomen were Edna Kelly
(N.Y.), Edith Green (Ore.), Lenore Sullivan (Mo.) and Coya Knutson (Minn.).
58. Spitballs in the House, 68 Time, July 30, 1956, at 9.
59. Paul, supra note 54, at 618.
60. American Women, supra note 34, at 49.
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Act. It was alerted to this possibility on July 9, 1963, when Presi-
dent Kennedy, at the recommendation of Esther Peterson, called
together over 300 representatives of women's organizations to "dis-
cuss those aspects of the nation's civil rights program in which wo-
men and women's organizations can play a special role."61 The
NWP was included among those invited, but NWP President
Emma Guffy Miller sent Nina Horton Avery in her place. Avery
cornered Kennedy as he left to ask him to meet with the NWP to
discuss the ERA, then she departed herself. She reported that the
word "sex" did not appear in the bill so there was no reason to
stay. The NWP did not participate in the National Women's Com-
mittee on Civil Rights that was organized that evening.62
During the next few months, both the civil rights bill and the
nation experienced several dramatic and emotional shocks. Civil
rights supporters marched on Washington on August 28, 1963,
where they heard Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., give his famous "I
have a dream" speech. Afterwards President Kennedy met with
march leaders to discourage them from trying to strengthen Title
VII and other portions of the bill because doing so would kill nec-
essary Republican support. Two weeks later, four children were
killed when a black church was bombed in Birmingham, Alabama.
Liberal Democrats responded by strengthening the civil rights bill,
which was then in the subcommittee of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee. A major change was made in Kennedy's weak employ-
ment measure, which only covered government contractors and
relied on persuasion rather than force of law.6 3 The new Title VII
created an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which
had the power to investigate and, after a hearing, to order violators
to "cease and desist." Its scope was broadened to include all em-
ployers with over twenty-five employees. The Republicans, who
thought they had a deal worked out with the Justice Department,
felt betrayed, and it took the combined political skills of President
Kennedy and Chair Celler of the Judiciary Committee to hammer
out a compromise. The EEOC survived, but its "cease and desist"
powers did not; the EEOC was left with only the power to investi-
gate and conciliate. The bill was sent to the Rules Committee the
day before Kennedy was assassinated. 64
61. Peterson, supra note 33, at 300.
62. See NWP Papers, supra note 51, on reel 108 for the following: telegram of
July 1, 1963, from John F. Kennedy to Emma Guffy Miller; letter of July 13, 1963,
from Nina Horton Avery to Emma Guffy Miller; Nina Horton Avery, Report on
White House Conference on Civil Rights with Women's Organizations (Jul. 9,
1963).
63. Loevy, supra note 1, at 65.
64. Id. at 62-75; Whalen and Whalen, supra note 10, at 27-28, 34-35, 59.
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As a result of Kennedy's death, passage of a civil rights bill
became a priority with Congress and the new Administration.
This emphasis was fully backed by public opinion. A December
Newsweek poll showed that sixty-two percent of the people sup-
ported civil rights,6 5 and a National Opinion Research Center sur-
vey showed eighty-three percent in favor of equal employment
opportunity for blacks.66 The momentum thwarted the plans of
Rep. Smith to use his power as chair of the House Rules Commit-
tee to stop or at least delay the civil rights bill.67 Instead he sub-
jected "this nefarious bill"68 to ten days of intense scrutiny at
hearings in January, 1964.69 It was during these hearings that the
idea of adding "sex" to the prohibited discriminations was publicly
proposed by Smith and other members of the Rules Committee.7 0
Although Alice Paul considered such actions to be "sideshows" 7 1
to the ERA, the NWP had been soliciting support for it for several
weeks, and its National Council had passed a formal resolution on
December 16, 1963, asking that the civil rights bill be amended. 72
The prospects did not look good. None of the national women's or-
ganizations would help, and Rep. Catherine May (R., Wash.) could
not find one among the forty Congressional allies she queried who
would support a sex amendment.73
After numerous requests, the NWP finally received assur-
ances from Reps. Smith, Katherine St. George, and Martha Grif-
fiths that they would introduce an amendment on the floor.
Although both St. George and Smith argued that because they op-
65. See Whalen and Whalen, supra note 10, at 89-90.
66. See Burstein, supra note 39, at 46.
67. Patricia G. Zelman, Women, Work, and National Policy: The Kennedy-
Johnson Years 60-61 (1980).
68. Whalen and Whalen, supra note 10, at 91.
69. Paul, supra note 54, at 615, 622, 624; NWP Papers, supra note 51, on reel
108.
70. Loevy, supra note 1, at 100.
71. NWP Papers, supra note 51, on reel 108.
72. Id. See also Caruthers Gholson Berger, Equal Pay, Equal Employment Op-
portunity and Equal Enforcement of the Law for Women, 5 Val. U.L. Rev. 326
(1971).
73. Zelman, supra note 67, at 60-61; Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 before
the House Comm. on Rules, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 125, 366, 558 (1964) [hereinafter
Civil Rights]; Loevy, supra note 1, at 96-100; Paul, supra note 54, at 615, 622, 624.
The resolution is in NWP Papers, supra note 51, on reel 108. Portions are cited by
Caruthers Gholson Berger, supra note 72, at 332; Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists,
Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J.S. Hist. 37, 43 (1983); and Rupp and Taylor, supra
note 29, at 176. Reel 108 also contains a four-page, single-spaced, unsigned "running
report of c.r. bill progress," apparently written in late February, 1964. The author
was probably Caruthers Gholson Berger, who was an attorney in the Labor Depart-
ment and a member of the National Council of the NWP.
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posed the bill, any amendment they introduced would be suspect,
Griffiths felt that Smith's sponsorship would insure at least a hun-
dred Southern votes.74 The three Representatives agreed that
Smith would do the honors, and the others would back him up.
They decided to concentrate their efforts on Title VII. 7 5
On January 9, as the hearings on H.R. 7152 began, Reps.
Smith and Celler exchanged their views:
Smith: I have just had a letter this morning, which I was go-
ing to bring to your attention later, from the National Wo-
men's [sic] Party. They want to know why you did not include
sex in this bill. Why did you not?
Celler: Do you want to put it in, Mr. Chairman?
Smith: I think I will offer an amendment. The National Wo-
men's [sic] Party were [sic] serious about it.76
On January 21, Rep. Colmer (D., Miss.) brought the issue up
again.
One more thing, and I do this by request more or less....
There is nothing in here about sex, is there, although we got
quite a bit of publicity a while back because that question was
raised. There is no provision in here about the discrimination
against women because of their sex in all this consideration, is
there?77
On January 26, Rep. Smith appeared on "Meet the Press," where
May Craig, White House reporter for the Portland, Maine, Press
Herald and an NWP member, asked him if he would put equal
rights for women in Title VII from the floor. "I might do that," he
said.78 On January 30, before the Rules Committee voted 11 to 4
to send the civil rights bill to the House floor, one Member moved
that the Rules Committee give specific clearance to an amendment
to bar discrimination on the basis of sex. This was voted down, 8
to 7.79 Two days later, at President Johnson's weekly press confer-
74. Bird, supra note 3, at 7.
75. "[R]unning report of c.r. bill progress," NWP Papers, supra note 51, on reel
108. This report states that the NWP also asked St. George and Julia Hansen (D.,
Wash.) to introduce a "sex" amendment before asking Smith, but were turned
down. St. George said she opposed the entire bill (though she voted for it in the
end) and Hansen would not violate an agreement among the Democratic leadership
that there be no amendments. Only Griffiths was enthusiastic about a "sex"
amendment. See also Paul, supra note 54, at 623-25, which credits Smith with lim-
iting attempts to add "sex" to the bill of Title VII, even though the NWP would
have preferred a general amendment to all of the Titles.
76. Civil Rights, supra note 73, at 125 (statements of Howard W. Smith, Chair-
man, and Emanuel Celler).
77. Id, at 366 (statement of William M. Colmer).
78. Bird, supra note 3, at 3-4.
79. The vote is reported in 20 Cong. Q. Almanac 344 (1964), but there is no rec-
ord of which way each Rules Committee member voted on this proposal. Rep.
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ence, a reporter asked if the President would support a ban on sex
discrimination in the civil rights bill. Johnson, who had recently
been campaigning for more women in government, gave a noncom-
mittal answer.80
Although the three Representatives no doubt solicited sup-
port from other members of Congress, not all were working with
them. On the fifth and sixth days of debate, Rep. John Dowdy (D.,
Tex.) offered his own amendments to add "sex" to Titles II, III, IV
and V of the bill. A staunch opponent of civil rights who no doubt
knew of Smith's plans from the Rules Committee hearings, he had
not been recruited by the NWP.81 All of his amendments were
overwhelmingly defeated, as were all but 34 of the 124 floor
amendments made to the civil rights bill.82 The House leadership
of the civil rights bill, Republican Bill McCulloch (Ohio) and Dem-
ocrat Emanuel Celler, had agreed with opponents that debate on
the bill and floor amendments would not be cut off. But they had
agreed between themselves "that if a proposed amendment did no
violence to the bill or to the principles which underlay it, they
would be flexible to preserve harmony .... However, if substan-
tive changes were sought, they would be intractable."8 3 Although
one could argue that increasing the scope of the bill did it no vio-
lence, it was this agreement that House members whom Catherine
May and others approached were unwilling to violate.8 4
But violate it many did. On Saturday, February 8, 1964, Rep.
Smith moved to add "sex" to Title VII. Unlike his 1956 speech,
this time he played it for laughs, setting up a mocking and jocular
tone which led to the two hour debate being dubbed "Ladies Day"
Katherine St. George (R., NY) was a member of the Rules Committee at that time
and is the most likely person to have made the motion.
80. Cong. Q. Weekly Report, Feb. 7, 1964, at 281 (report of President Johnson's
press conference of Feb. 1, 1964). See also Zelman, supra note 67, at ch. 3 passim.
81. Zelman claims that Dowdy "worked closely with Smith," but cites no source
for this. Zelman, supra note 67, at 63. Alice Paul stated in her oral history that the
NWP had no advance warning that Rep. Dowdy intended to introduce sex amend-
ments to other sections of the civil rights bill; but they were happy that he did,
even while they were dismayed that he was "howled down." Paul, supra note 54, at
625. Once alerted to his interest, the NWP gave him factual material to use in his
arguments for the addition of "sex" to other titles. Id. at 629.
82. Whalen and Whalen, supra note 10, at 121.
83. Id. at 109.
84. Paul, supra note 54, at 625; Brauer, supra note 73, at 46, 48; 110 Cong. Rec.
1978-79, 2280-81, 2264-65, 2297 (1964). The amendments to Titles II and III were de-
feated, 43 to 115 and 26 to 112. These were both teller votes, so there is no public
record of who voted for what. (The House normally formed itself into a Committee
of the Whole in order to debate and amend bills during which it took no recorded
votes. Once the Committee was dissolved so the House could vote on the final bill,
recorded votes were taken.) Voice votes defeated the other Dowdy amendments.
There was some debate on Titles II-IV, but none on adding "sex" to Title V.
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in the House. Celler reacted as usual and denounced the amend-
ment as an "entering wedge" for the ERA.85 Five Congresswomen
spoke in its favor, including Edna Kelly (D., N.Y.), who had op-
posed the 1956 amendment. Martha Griffiths said that "if there
had been any necessity to have pointed out that women were a sec-
ond-class sex, the laughter would have proved it."86 But the wo-
men were not a united front. The administration had tried,
without success, to talk Griffiths out of supporting the amend-
ment, but they did persuade Edith Green (D., Or.) to speak against
it. After denouncing discrimination based on sex, she went on to
say that racial discrimination caused far more suffering, and a bill
aimed at helping Negroes should not be cluttered up.8 7 She read a
letter from the AAUW opposing the "sex" amendment. The bill's
leaders had also obtained a letter from the Labor Department,
which quoted Esther Peterson quoting the President's Commission
on the disadvantages of treating sex discrimination like race.
Their efforts were insufficient. The House approved the amend-
ment by 168 to 133.88
The fact that Smith played the "sex" amendment for laughs
and that all the men who spoke for it were from Southern or bor-
der states and voted against the final bill lent credence to the view
that it was merely a ploy by opponents. But if that were the
only-or even the primary-motive, the Title VII amendment
would have met the same fate as Rep. Dowdy's "sex" amendments
to the other Titles. At least some of the other attempts to "clutter
up" Title VII should have passed that same day. The two Dowdy
"sex" amendments on which there were counted votes earlier in
the week-to Titles II and III-were rejected 43 to 115 and 26 to
112.89 Shortly after "sex" was added to Title VII by a vote of 168
to 133, Dowdy moved to add "age" to the prohibited discrimina-
tions. Despite a very serious debate, in which Smith was for and
Celler against the addition of age, this amendment was rejected, 94
to 123.90 A motion to strike all of Title VII lost 90 to 150.91
Nineteen amendments were offered that day, and fourteen
85. Bauer, supra note 73, at 49.
86. Id.
87. EEOC, Legislative History, supra note 49, at 3222-23.
88. Whalen and Whalen, supra note 10, at 117-19; EEOC, Legislative History,
supra note 36, at 3213-28; 110 Cong. Rec., 2577-84 (1964); Zelman, supra note 67, at
64-67; Brauer, supra note 73, at 48-51; Rupp and Taylor, supra note 29, at 177-78;
Harrison, On Account of Sex, supra note 16, at 177-79; New York Times, Feb. 9,
1964, at 1, col. 1.
89. 110 Cong. Rec. 1978-79, 228081, 2264-65, 2297 (1964)
90. Id at 2596-99.
91. Id at 2599-2607. However, the House did accept an amendment to permit
discrimination against atheists, rejecting the proposal 137 to 98. Id. at 2607-11. By
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adopted (most of them technical ones by the bill's sponsor, Celler).
The bill's managers clearly had between 112 and 133 Representa-
tives who could be counted on to be present and vote down any
amendment when asked. Equally clearly there were several dozen
Representatives who came to the floor on a Saturday morning to
vote to add "sex" to Title VII, who weren't available, or requested,
to vote on any of the other amendments. The vote on the "sex"
amendment was the largest counted vote that day. The overall
voting pattern implies that there was a large group of Congress-
men (in addition to the Congresswomen) that was serious about
adding "sex" to Title VII, but only to Title VII. That is not consis-
tent with an interpretation that the addition of "sex" was part of a
plot to scuttle the bill.
Furthermore, if the bill's managers had perceived the "sex"
amendment as a serious threat to Title VII, they had ample oppor-
tunity to scuttle it two days later when the entire civil rights bill
was up for review before the final vote. At that time, Rep. Robert
Griffin (R., Mich.) tried to amend the amendment to make it appli-
cable only to those who certified that a spouse, if any, was unem-
ployed "when the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred." This was defeated 15 to 96.92 Four of the twenty-eight
amendments to Title VII that were offered that day were
adopted,93 including one proposed by Rep. Frances Bolton (D.,
Ohio) making "sex" subject to the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion exception.94 A motion for a roll call vote on the "sex" amend-
ment was defeated, but, right before the final roll call, a separate
voice vote on "sex" affirmed its addition to Title VII.g5 The final
roll call on February 10 registered 290 to 130 in favor of the Civil
Rights Act. If those who voiced their approval of the "sex"
amendment had been mostly opponents of the Act, it would have
been removed at that time.
After the bill went to the Senate, The National Federation of
Business and Professional Women (BPW), with 150,000 members
and chapters in every state, joined the campaign. Marguerite
Rawalt "wrote women lawyers and BPW and Zonta members
across the country, explaining the bill and Title VII, telling them
whom to write, what to say." 96 She also asked black attorney
voice vote two days later, the House permitted discrimination against Communists.
Id at 2719-29.
92. Id at 2728.
93. EEOC, Legislative History, supra note 36, in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3.
94. 110 Cong. Rec. 2718-21 (1964).
95. Id at 2804.
96. Rawalt, supra note 7, at 365. Rawalt had been an active proponent of the
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Pauli Murray to draft a supportive memorandum since Murray
"could act freely, being outside the government, and could also
present an argument as a victim of both race and sex discrimina-
tion."9 7 As a result Texas BPW members wrote President John-
son asking his support, Illinois BPW members deluged Senate
Minority Leader Everett Dirksen with telegrams, and Murray's
memorandum was reproduced and distributed to the President,
Vice President, Attorney General and key Senators.98
The Johnson administration did not urge that the "sex"
amendment be dropped by the Senate. Indeed, after the bill went
to the Senate, President Johnson stated that he supported it "ex-
actly in its present form."99 Democratic leaders said they opposed
removing "sex," and even Esther Peterson lobbied the Senate for
its retention. When Senator Everett Dirksen (R., Ill.), whose sup-
port was necessary for Senate passage, said he wanted to remove
the amendment, Sen. Margaret Chase Smith (R., Me.), at the urg-
ing of the NWP, persuaded the Republican Conference to vote
against him. He finally gave up, "in order to avoid the wrath of
the women."'10 0
Who Done It?
Both the NWP and Martha Griffiths have claimed sole credit
for the addition of "sex" to Title VII (though the NWP did give
ERA and of legislation to improve the status of women most of her life. She was a
member of many organizations but her primary affiliation was the BPW, of which
she had been president. Her oral history, supra note 7, does not explain why she
and BPW apparently did little on Title VII prior to passage in the House. However,
Alice Paul stated in her oral history that BPW's response to a phone request for
support, the week before the vote, was that the organization could not take action
without a resolution's first being passed by the national convention. Most likely
this was a standard response by whomever answered the phone, since the NWP and
the BPW did not have a good working relationship. Rawalt probably found out
about the addition of "sex" to Title VII in the House by reading about it in the
newspapers. Once alerted, she could use her considerable influence in BPW to mo-
bilize its members without need of an authorizing resolution.
97. Rawalt, supra note 7, at 396.
98. Judith Paterson, Be Somebody: A Biography of Marguerite Rawalt 154
(1986); Murray, supra note 32, at 356-7; Zelman, supra note 67, at 70; Bird, supra
note 3, at 13.
99. Zelman, supra note 67, at 70.
100. Zelman, supra note 67, at 70-1; Brauer, supra note 73, at 52-55; Murray,
supra note 32, at 357-58; 110 Cong. Rec. 6239 (1964). See NWP Papers, supra note
51, on reel 109, for letter from Anita Politzer to Margaret Chase Smith, April 2,
1964; letter from Smith to Politzer, April 9; letter from E.G. Miller to Mary Ken-
nedy, April 15, 1964; letter from Alice Paul to Mary Kennedy, undated draft citing
Dirksen quote to the Baltimore Sun of May 25, 1964. Dirksen was an ERA sup-
porter. Indeed, Alice Paul wrote Marjorie Longwell on August 4, 1956, praising
Dirksen's "uncompromising support" while a member of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. NWP Papers, supra note 51, on reel 103.
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some credit to the Republican Congresswomen). 01 Both no doubt
deserve credit, but even more credit should go to the fortuitous cir-
cumstances leading up to that fateful day. The most important of
these was the civil rights movement, without which there would
not have been a Civil Rights Act. Given the amount of time neces-
sary to pass the relatively innocuous Equal Pay Act, and the com-
promises involved, it is highly improbable that an act prohibiting
employment discrimination by sex alone would ever have passed
Congress, let alone one creating a federal enforcement agency.
Nor was this vote taken in isolation, despite the claim by op-
ponents that the "sex" amendment was hasty and ill-considered.
Testimony about employment discrimination dominated the hear-
ings held on the Equal Pay Act in a House Committee in March of
1962 and 1963 and in a Senate Committee in April of 1963. In mid-
October, the Report of the President's Commission had been re-
leased with great publicity. President Johnson had made several
public statements in January of 1964 about his intentions to bring
more women into government. The lobbying efforts of the NWP
were weak compared to those of the civil rights forces, but they
were not non-existent. The NWP solicited help from other wo-
men's organizations and sent letters to many Members of Con-
gress. A member of BPW from Texas walked into the NWP
headquarters to volunteer full-time just as its campaign began.
She distributed pamphlets prepared by an NWP attorney from sta-
tistics collected by the Women's Bureau with such titles as "The
Discriminations Against Women Workers are Greater than Those
101. Brauer, supra note 73, at 40, 51, and Berger, supra note 72, at 333, give the
NWP sole credit. It should be noted that at the time she wrote this article, Berger
had been a member of the National Council of the NWP since 1960. On April 8,
1964, Anita Politzer, Virginia Homer, and Miriam Holder sent telegrams to Mar-
garet Chase Smith and Sen. Kenneth Keating, claiming that "sex was included
chiefly through the efforts of Republican Congresswomen." NWP Papers, supra
note 51, on reel 109. Although Griffiths was an NWP member, the two had a low
opinion of each other. Griffiths said in 1969 that the NWP did not have much influ-
ence on Congress. Freeman, supra note 5, at 53 n.24. Paul claimed in her 1972 oral
history that Griffiths (and St. George) refused the NWP's request to sponsor a
"sex" amendment. Paul, supra note 54, at 623. Griffiths told Zelman in 1975 that
"the arguments she presented on the House floor were responsible for the amend-
ment's passage," and her biographer claims that she "is generally considered its au-
thor." Zelman, supra note 67, at 68-69; Emily George, R.S.M., Martha W. Griffiths,
149 (1982). However, Griffiths also told Brauer in 1979 "that prior to the floor de-
bate she spoke of her plans only to Leonor Kretzer Sullivan and Edna Flannery
Kelly, both friends and Democratic representatives." Brauer, supra note 73, at 47.
Whether or not Griffiths persuaded the Members to change their minds on the
"sex" amendment, someone had to bring them to the floor in the first place. The




Against Negro and Non-White Men."102
The other experienced lobbyist was Esther Peterson. While
she officially opposed the "sex" amendment and supplied material
for the House floor debate, there is no evidence that she mobilized
her considerable resources against it in the Senate, even though
there was adequate time to do so. Indeed, in April, Peterson
drafted President Johnson's answer to a letter from Texas BPW
inquiring about his stand on the "sex" provision, expressing sup-
port for "equal opportunity for women" and the "present form" of
the bill.103
While the initiative for adding "sex" to Title VII clearly lies
with the NWP, the more important questions are who voted for it
and why they did. This would be simpler to answer if there had
been a roll call vote. However, there was only a teller vote. Indi-
viduals on either side passed through two tellers who counted
them but did not record names. Even if all the Congresswomen,
except Edith Green, voted for the "sex" amendment, that would
account for only ten votes out of 168. The Southerners might have
wished to undermine the civil rights bill, but many of them had
concluded that passage was inevitable and had gone home. Only
eighty-six Southern Democrats were present to vote against the
Civil Rights Act on Monday, February 10;104 it is unlikely that
more than that were present to vote for "sex" on February 8. Who
were the Members who came to the floor to support "sex" on Sat-
urday and came back on Monday to support the entire Civil Rights
Act?
The only evidence on who voted for "sex" on February 8
comes from Rep. Martha Griffiths, who was one of the tellers. She
told an interviewer many years later that most of the votes in
favor of the amendment came from Southerners and Republi-
102. Berger, supra note 72, at 333; Zelman, supra note 67, at 45-47, 61, 138 n.17;
Paul oral history, supra note 54, at 622, 626-27. Copies of letters to Members of
Congress, the NWP pamphlets, and report by Hettie Milam Cook on H.R. 7152,
Equal Rights for Women, are in the NWP Papers, supra note 51, on reel 108. Ber-
ger wrote the NWP arguments, but she could not be public about her participation
because she worked for the Labor Department. Alice Paul credits her for working
every night without being specific about what she did. Paul, supra note 54, at 628.
Berger was more open about her role in a 1982 interview. Rupp and Taylor, supra
note 29, at 177-78, 251 n.79.
103. Quoted in Zelman, supra note 67, at 71, 140 n.53.
104. These numbers come from Whalen and Whalen, supra note 10, at 111-12,
122. 120 Cong. Q. Almanac 606 (1964) says 92 Southern Democrats voted against
final passage of the civil rights bill. The difference in numbers is probably due to
different definitions of Southern.
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cans.105 The final vote on the entire civil rights bill was a roll call;
the Civil Rights Act was passed by a coalition of 152 (mostly
Northern) Democrats and 138 Republicans. 106 It appears that re-
sponsibility for the addition of "sex" to Title VII lies in the hands
of the Republican Members of the House of Representatives; they
are the ones who voted for both the "sex" amendment and the
civil rights bill. This raises another question. Why should the
Republicans, not noted for their love of federal regulation, want to
do this?
The answer most likely lies in the Equal Rights Amendment,
which had traditionally received much more support from Repub-
licans than Democrats. Support for the ERA went into the Repub-
lican Party platform earlier, and stayed in longer, than in that of
the Democrats. The Senate votes on the ERA in 1946, 1950, and
1953 showed that many more Republicans than Democrats sup-
ported it.107 Opposition to the ERA since World War II had been
largely from labor unions and their supporters, whose elected rep-
resentatives were to be found primarily among Northern and lib-
eral Democrats. Although almost everyone except the NWP
thought the ERA was a dead issue, that did not deter the NWP
from combing the halls of Congress every year seeking support.
NWP stalwarts repeatedly asked Members to sign pledge cards
and frequently compiled lists of sponsors. Their systematic lobby-
ing educated many Congresspeople about sex discrimination and
built up a network of relationships with those who were sympa-
thetic to the NWP's concerns.108
Nor should one assume that the Southerners' only motive in
voting to add "sex" to Title VII was their antagonism toward civil
rights. To judge from the sponsors,109 ERA sympathizers were
largely Republican and Southern Democrats-i.e., people who had
a distaste for government regulation and were not attuned to the
concerns of organized labor. Rep. Smith spoke in favor of a "sex"
amendment in 1956 and had been an ERA sponsor since 1943;
when he retired in 1966, the NWP lamented the loss of "our Rock
105. Brauer, supra note 73, at 51 (citing his January 11, 1979, interview with
Griffiths).
106. 20 Cong. Q. Almanac 606 (1964) reported the vote as Republicans: 138 to 34;
Northern Democrats: 141 to 4; Southern Democrats: 11 to 92.
107. The votes are reported in I:3 Cong. Q. 568 (July-September 1946); 6 Cong.
Q. Almanac 539 (1950); 9 Cong. Q. Almanac 386 (1950).
108. Rupp and Taylor, supra note 29, at 191.
109. NWP Papers, supra note 51, contain frequent lists of sponsors. None of
these lists are specifically cited because there are so many.
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of Gibraltar."110 Despite the humor that Smith injected into the
"Ladies Day" debate, what evidence there is, does not indicate that
he had proposed his amendment as a joke.i l l
Although the prohibition of sex discrimination in employ-
ment became law in a manner atypical of major legislation, it was
not as thoughtless, or as devious, as has previously been assumed.
Instead it was the product of a small but dedicated group of wo-
men, in and out of Congress, who knew how to take advantage of
the momentum generated by a larger social movement to promote
their own goals, and a larger group of Congressmen willing to
make an affirmative statement in favor of women's rights. But it
was casual. At a time when the division between "men's jobs" and
"women's jobs" was still taken for granted, the implications of
prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of sex had
not been fully explored. If they had been, so revolutionary a pro-
posal is unlikely to have passed. Even the President's Commission
cautioned that "[e]xperience is needed in determining what consti-
tutes unjustifted discrimination in the treatment of women work-
ers."112 That is why the "sex" provision is more easily understood
as a surrogate for the ERA, an issue which had been extensively
discussed, if not agreed upon. Indeed, when Rep. McDonough in-
troduced his "sex" amendment to the 1956 Civil Rights Act, he
specifically linked it to the ERA and the "voluminous evidence of
record in hearings ... to show there has been discrimination be-
cause of sex."113 After 40 years of effort, the NWP still had not
persuaded two-thirds of Congress to support the ERA, but it had
apparently persuaded a majority.
Conclusion
In his eight case studies of policy innovation, Nelson Polsby
identified two patterns into which three cases each fit (two cases
did not fit any pattern). "Acute" innovation has four characteris-
tics: low partisan conflict, minimal research, short elapsed time,
and fusion of stages. "Incubated" innovations emerge slowly.
Although "founded upon much research and reasoned advocacy,"
they are also controversial.114 On first view, the addition of "sex"
110. 1 NWP Bulletin 3 (Nov.-Dec. 1966) is in NWP Papers, supra note 51, on reel
124.
111. Brauer, supra note 73, at 45. Harrison, On Account of Sex, supra note 16, at
295 n.20.
112. American Women, supra note 34, at 49 (my emphasis).
113. 102 Cong. Rec. 13,124 (1956).




to Title VII appears to fit the "acute" cluster, a classic case of "slip-
ping an initiation in as a side issue or as a nonissue." 115 However,
the record reveals more "incubation" than initially apparent. The
NWP adherents were policy entrepreneurs. Although their pri-
mary goal was a Constitutional amendment, they were constantly
looking for any opportunity to gain equality for women. They
were an established presence on Capitol Hill, where they were one
of those interest groups that had built "career-long alliances [with]
elected officials ... by which the preferences of one become the
preoccupations of both."116 Their success in committing the fed-
eral government to the prohibition of sex discrimination in em-
ployment, despite the absence of popular demand, came largely
through persistence.
Persistence alone, however, does not account for this major
achievement. The civil rights movement, and the various civil
rights bills, opened up a window of opportunity of which the activ-
ists took advantage. The NWP and women members of Congress
lacked the resources to effect major policy changes by themselves;
instead they grabbed the coattails of a major social movement
which did have these resources. Persistent opportunism forced the
federal government to make a major public policy innovation in an
area which it had not previously acknowledged as being very
important.
115. Id at 159.
116. Id. at 164.
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